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Abstract 
Autonomous robots (AR) can get themselves into a wide range of situations, and they do not 
have a human to look after them in fine detail all the time. When we test autonomous robots, 
we must therefore care deeply about the range and diversity of the situations in which we 
have simulated and tested them  W we must make sure that the situation coverage of our 
testing is adequate. Situation coverage measures can be implemented quantitatively, and so 
unlock a range of automated testing strategies. There are epistemic challenges to justifying the 
confidence we should attach to test results driven by situation coverage, but they are not 
fundamentally more difficult than those faced by other coverage criteria. 
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1 It is hard to derive adequate safety requirements for 
autonomous robots 
The courier robot rolls through the suburban streets, its heavy cargo of Amazon 
books, greetings cards and groceries gives it a substantial mass. It dutifully stays 
under the speed limit, gives way to other drivers, all the while counting down the 
house numbers as it heads for number 51. Suddenly, around the corner from 
Acacia Avenue comes an ice-cream van, grotesque in its lurid colours and its 
horrendous cacophony sounding. On top of the van is mounted a menacing 
object, roughly consistent with either a surface-to-air missile or a tank gun. The 
courier slams itself into panic evasive mode, and screeches across the opposing 
lane, onto the grass verge and through a garden fence. It is badly damaged, but at 
least no-one is hurt.  
Kƌ ? 
Another courier rolls along a fast road cutting through the city, scanning carefully 
for the icy surfaces that could result from the current cold temperatures. Ahead, a 
careless driver crashes into another car and a dangerous pile-ƵƉƐƉŝŶƐƵƉ ?ďƵƚŝƚ ?Ɛ
ok because the courier can see a vector where it can go off road and skid to a halt 
just before it reaches a large crowd of children in heavy coats. The courier veers 
off the road, adjusting its driving dynamics appropriately just as it first touches the 
grass  W the soft, white, powdĞƌǇŐƌĂƐƐǁŚŝĐŚŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚďĞŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞ
ŐƌĂƐƐƐŚŽƵůĚĂƚĂůů ?dŚĞĐŽƵƌŝĞƌǁŚĞĞůƐĚŽŶ ?ƚďĞŚĂǀĞĂƐƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚ
the brakes locked solid it just keeps moving. As it skids towards the children it 
flashes its warning lights. All they can do is watch, rabbits in headlights, as the 
robot tumbles towards them. One of them drops the sledge. 
Autonomous robots (AR) can get themselves into a wide range of situations, and they do not have a 
human to look after them in fine detail all the time. They must therefore react to those 
circumstances in a way that is sensible, or at least not disastrous. A courier robot that reacts to an 
ambulance by moving to ram it is a poor courier and a public hazard. 
As Dogramadzi et al. suggest in [1], the majority of challenging situations that AR will find themselves 
ŝŶĂƌĞůĞƐƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ “ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐďǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ W dealing with the 
environment and staying out of trouble. It is easy to forget about these situations, or never become 
ĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ?ŝĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƵƐĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚƚĞƐƚŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĂŝŵĞĚĂƚĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ
them.  
If the above example vehicles had been tested using a system coverage approach  W if they had been 
tested until some set of system components (software functions, modules, paths, branches) had all 
been tested at least once  W these issues would not necessarily have been identified. They refer to 
external situations  W situations that may not be addressed at all by any system component. 
If the above example vehicles had been tested using a requirements coverage approach  W if they had 
been tested until their conformance with all identified requirements had been tested adequately 
(for some reasonable definition of adequately)  W these issues would not necessarily have been 
identified. The snow-handling example refers to a terrain type that in this (hopefully unrealistic) 
example might not been identified as a requirement for handling; it represents a failure of validation 
(with respect to reality) rather than verification (of system against specification). Requirements-
based testing is primarily a verification activity, so might well not have found these faults. 
If the above example vehicles had been tested with some form of scenario coverage  W where the aim 
was to cover a representative set of scenarios  W these issues would not necessarily have been 
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identified. It is likely that a relatively small set of scenarios would have been explored, and that these 
would have been explored in a narrow way. Adequate testing of AR crucially requires that we study 
not just linear scenarios but the dynamics that arise from the interaction of the AR with its 
environment.  
When we test AR, we must therefore care deeply about the range and diversity of the situations in 
which we have simulated and tested them. We need to test them on roads, in the rain, and with 
people in the way. tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĞƐƚƚŚĞŵǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŵŝƚƚĞŶƚƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŽƌĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂƐƚŝĐŬǇǁŚĞĞů ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĞƐƚƚŚĞŵŝŶcombinations of all of those cases. We should, as 
part of our decision to declare said robot viable and safe, become confident that we have explored 
an adequate range of situations. We can refer to a measure of this adequacy as situation coverage. 
Situation coverage is particularly important because it is hard to derive adequate safety 
requirements for AR. As ever, we know what harm looks like (e.g. a robot car runs over a pedestrian) 
but we do not know all the paths that can lead to that harm (e.g. it might be that it cannot 
distinguish between humans and lifelike statues, so after going into a skid it chooses to hit one 
pedestrian rather than knock over three mannequins). We are unlikely to generalise well from our 
experience with existing systems; AR are not like existing systems in that they are neither humans 
nor traditional software, and we are working on (and expect) lots of novel, adventurous AR uses (e.g. 
swarming sensors, ultra-long-duration high-altitude monitors, crawlers finding earthquake 
survivors). This fusion of novel technology and novel use is a classic analysis-challenging 
circumstance (Def Stan 00-56 users are referred here to the McDermid Square [2]  W we are in the 
most difficult quadrant). 
It is likely that conventional analysis techniques will help us only so much. AR software is necessarily 
very complex, and as noted above it must respond well to a very wide range of environmental 
stimuli (indeed, it must cope not just with stimuli but with situations  W it must continually respond to 
stimuli so as to control itself and its environment and to maintain safety constraints). Techniques 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŽůZŽďŽƚŝĐƐ>ĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ ?ƐEnvironmental Survey Hazard Analysis [1] have potential, 
but as purely manual techniques it is not clear to us that they will, alone, be able to bypass the 
assumptions of the testers about what will be challenging and what will not. Linear-scenario-based 
approaches may not be particularly insightful, as much of the interesting behaviour here happens 
once the AZŝƐŽĨĨƚŚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂůƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ “ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ
circumstances. 
It is likely that we will want to supplement the above techniques with automated analysis and 
testing tools, and many forms of such automation need to be guided by some explicit criteria. 
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2 Situation coverage methods can help guide us to adequate 
requirements 
In conventional software testing, there is already a great tradition of coverage measures  W the most 
ďĂƐŝĐďĞŝŶŐ “ĚŝĚĞĂĐŚůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ?ƐƐŽƵƌĐĞĐŽĚĞŐĞƚĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚďǇĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞƚĞƐƚ ? ?ƐŝĚĞ
from the criticisms of many of them as software coverage measures (and there are many such 
criticisms), such pure system coverage measures may well miss external circumstances that matter. 
For example, if we follow Thompson [3] and set out to test an AR in all the circumstances its 
software treats differently (e.g. if the software distinguishes dry weather, wet weather, and icy 
weather, and we test under all of those) we may not realise that it does not handle some 
circumstances at all (e.g. that the software has no sensible plan for dealing with snow). 
We can adapt the ideas of software coverage to situation coverage  W we can aim to cover enough 
situations, and a diverse enough set of them. We can attempt to quantify this. 
If we have a concept of situation coverage, and metric or metrics that measure it, then we are better 
ƉůĂĐĞĚƚŽ “ǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞ ?ŽƵƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ W to discover the set of mid-level behavioural requirements 
that we need. Just enumerating the components of situations that can be encountered (terrain, 
ǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĞĞƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? “ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?ŵĂǇĐĂƵƐĞƵƐƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŵŽƌĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĐĨ. the typical experience 
when formalising requirements  W the rigour there forces clarity). 
A common concern when defining tests is that the requirements errors made by the testers (e.g. 
invalid assumptions, misunderstandings of intent, superficial models of external phenomena) may 
be the same set of requirements errors made by the programmers  W the tests may thus have blind 
spots exactly where the programs have faults (cf. the Knight-Leveson experiment [4]). Defining a 
situation space, and then covering it by generating situations, is a very indirect way of defining tests, 
so there is more chance that analysts will not make the same wrong assumptions that others made 
when designing the system. 
When we specifically consider simulated testing, as much AR testing of course will be, defining 
metrics for situation coverage can help us unlock the full power of modern automated testing 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚWhƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŵƵĐŚĨĂƐƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐƚŝůůďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĐŚĞĂƉĞƌ ?ƐŽ
automated testing is becoming more and more powerful. Given a good metric, automated testing 
can work very well. Without a metric, such techniques are often quite limited  W no metric means no 
heuristic search or similar techniques, so we are reduced to random (or brute-force exhaustive) test 
generation. 
The level of rigour we suggest here is perhaps best related to that of DO-178C and similar  W we are 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝŶŐƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐƚĞƐƚŝŶŐƵƐŝŶŐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽ ? ? ? ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨD
coverage for software), not the kind of absolute completeness that formal methods often strive for. 
Of course, we are not seriously suggesting that anyone should use only situation coverage to guide 
their testing. Relying on a single form of coverage criteria is unwise, and relying wholly on coverage 
criteria for test generation is also unwise (on the latter, see Gay et al. [5]). 
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3 Situation coverage measures are practical 
There are a variety of ways that situation coverage could be implemented  W entities and situation 
elements can be enumerated and combined in a variety of ways. Experimental design techniques 
can be used to choose critical combinations, and sensitivity or principal component analysis 
techniques can be used to prioritise them. 
Broadly, situation coverage measures can be approached from a Macro- or Micro- perspective. 
Macro-SC means looking at the situation overall and saying whether certain things are covered. For 
example, we can look at the map and say that there are trees on it, therefore trees are covered as an 
entity type. Micro-SC means that we watch the system run and see what small-scale situations are 
encountered. For example, ǁĞĐĂŶ “ǁĂƚĐŚ ?ƚŚĞAR and note that it does indeed enter the situation 
 “following another vehicle at a fixed distance ? ?tĞĐĂŶŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƵƐĞ macro as an approximation to 
micro (we look at the map and mission, and note that there is a stationary car blocking the lane that 
the AR would naturally take to its objective, so a micro-ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŽǀĞƌƚĂŬĞƐĂƉĂƌŬĞĚĐĂƌ ?ŝƐ
very likely to occur). 
At the macro scale, we can build situation coverage metrics based on entity types (e.g. is there a car? 
A tree? A humpback bridge?), number or ĚĞŶƐŝƚǇŽĨĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŐŝǀĞŶƚǇƉĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƚĞĂĚǇ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ?ŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƌƐŝŶƚŚĞǀŝůůĂŐĞ ? ? ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŽĨĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌĂĚŝŽŶĞƚ ? ? ?
mission types, and many more. The list is almost endless; the trick is to identify which metric 
elements are of high value for testing. 
At the micro scale, we can cover types of conflict (e.g. head-on, same course but slower, in wrong 
ůĂŶĞ ? ? ?ƐŵĂůů-scale relationships (e.g. following, overtaking, observing across a central reservation), 
paths taken (including analogues of path and branch coverage from software testing, where the 
paths and branches are literally roads and junctions on the map) and many more. Again, the 
challenge here is prioritisation. 
Given the metric components above, we can combine them in a variety of ways  W hit every coverage 
element (e.g. perform at least one run containing each entity type), hit every N-way combination of 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽŶĞƌƵŶƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƚƌĞĞƐĂŶĚǁĂůů ?ŽŶĞƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƚƌĞĞƐĂŶĚĨĞŶĐĞƐ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
so on; the software testing can furnish us with a wide variety of methods for combining elements. 
Probability can be included (e.g. attempt all situations down to estimated probability 1×10
-6
) and 
multi-objective optimisation techniques can try to maximise multiple values (e.g. get the AR to have 
as many low-speed collisions as possible with the most cautious other drivers). 
As with all testing, our choice of what to cover and not to cover is implicitly based on a uniformity 
hypothesis  W ǁŚĞŶǁĞƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚǁŽƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚĨŽƌĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞƐĂǇŝŶŐ
that the AR will behave the same under both, or at least will have the same failure behaviour. 
Analysis based on situation coverage can and must, of course complement existing approaches. 
Automated testing is particularly important because, as noted earlier, AR are going to be extremely 
complex systems and will need an enormous amount of testing. Situation coverage can help guide 
that testing. 
Situation coverage can, in ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ
a validation approach, which makes it complementary  W it can very plausibly show you that your 
current AR behaviour specification ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞǇŽƵƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵr (in context) that you 
desire. 
Implementing testing based on Macro-SC is very easy to do  W simple input space partitioning (see 
Grindal et al. [6] for a survey) and experimental design techniques can be applied. Micro-SC is harder 
to meet (because it involves predicting what will happen during test runs, based only on their initial 
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conditions) but there are many applicable techniques for this (e.g. see the recent work by Poulding 
et al. [7]). 
&Žƌ “ƌĂǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ ? ?Ɛituation elements) we can build on ontologies, including interaction ontologies 
[8]. All of these can be improved over time to meet our new situation coverage needs. 
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4 There are epistemic challenges to situation coverage, but they 
are not fatal 
Software coverage has been variously criticised, and with good reason  W it is yet another example of 
a metric to obsess over, to become obsessed with, and to fetishize, at the expense of bringing our 
experience and intuition and case-specific reasoning to the testing problem at hand. See Kaner et al. 
[9] for extensive discussion of this. 
Combined with automated test generation, coverage criteria are particularly pernicious, because 
they are definitely not enough on their own. It ?s one thing to use them on hand-crafted tests, the 
original design of which was not primarily motivated by the criteria, to sound out something you 
ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŵŝƐƐĞĚ ?ďǇŶŽƚĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐŝƚĂƚĂůů ? ?/ƚ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƚŽůĞƚĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƚĞƐƚƐ
solely guided by the criteria. There have been a number of demonstrations of this problem  W see Gay 
et al. [5] for a summary.  
The Macro-SC discussed earlier is particularly vulnerable to this, and Micro-SC provides a potential 
antidote  W it ensures that certain patterns of interaction do in fact occur. For example, it may be 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽ “ƚƌŝĐŬ ?ĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶďǇƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬŽĨƚĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚĐŽǀĞƌĂ
single coverage element but are otherwise very unchallenging for the AR. This is a particularly acute 
problem for situation coverage as there is no  “natural bound ?ŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƐƚ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚrast, when tests are 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĂƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶĨŽƌĂ “ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƚĞƐƚ ?ŝƐ
that the requirement is triggered and that adequate time (etc.) is given to observe the results. 
Similarly, when the unit of testing is the scenario, the unit of individual test adequacy is that the 
whole test is completed. It is not obvious how to define such adequacy criteria for situation 
coverage, other than by using additional criteria to drive the adequacy of each test, and then 
applying situation coverage as an additional check of the overall test set. 
Coverage weaknesses are a particularly acute problem for safety-ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵ ?ƌĞ
inevitably going to make some pretty serious claims based on the results. You can see these 
ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƚŚĂƚ ?ƐďĞĞŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽDƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ W the explicit rationale for using it, 
for trusting it in a safety-critical role, is extremely flimsy. 
Yet DO-178C still mandates MCDC. It is justifiable, in context, because it is just one part of a broader 
safety effort. We do not rely on MCDC alone; this paper does not propose that we rely on any 
situation coverage metric, no matter how sophisticated, alone. 
So, as ever, it will remain necessary to target multiple test coverage criteria simultaneously. When 
automatically generating tests, situation coverage can be used as the primary criterion, or can be 
mixed in with others. Similarly, when tests are hand-crafted using informal and largely implicit 
criteria, situation coverage can be measured as a check of what coverage has been achieved. 
Situation coverage is one approach to assessing the adequacy of AR testing  W it is not sufficient on its 
own, but it is valuable as part of broader assessment. 
We can build strong safety claims from many complementary weaker claims. The classic example is 
for software  W there are no grounds from testing alone to support software dangerous failure rates 
below 1 × 10
-4
 per hour but it can contribute to claims several orders of magnitude higher [10]. 
In any case, it is impossible to avoid the need to claim situation coverage. When you assert that your 
tests (of software alone, or of the whole system) are adequate, you are asserting that the system has 
been tested in an adequate range of situations. By systematising this, by having actual situation 
coverage metrics, we can refine this process and make more valid claims. We can study the whole 
issue better. 
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A situation coverage metric without a theory behind it is of little value  W a coverage criterion cannot 
be convincing unless there is reason to believe that the way it subdivides the world is valuable, i.e. 
that the uniformity hypothesis (see earlier) is at least close to true.  
There are a number of grounds on which a supporting theory could be built: 
x It could be based on past experience, e.g. on what entities and combinations have caused 
trouble for similar systems in the past. 
x It could be based on an abstract model of an AR, such as the NASA Goddard Agent 
Architecture as used in [1]. This would then support a uniformity hypothesis based on the 
uniformity of significance of events/situations for this abstract model. 
x It could be based on a systematic refinement of an environment from the very abstract to 
the very concrete, perhaps in the vein of Ontological Hazard Analysis [11]. 
We can also evaluate situation coverage measures empirically, although we are unlikely to be able to 
support safety-critical claims through this alone. We can seed faults into the AR (perhaps through 
mutation testing techniques [12]) and evaluate how well SC-guided testing finds the behaviour 
caused by the faults. 
All test coverage measures, and all requirements analysis measures, raise difficult issues of 
epistemology. Being at the intersection of those two areas means that situation coverage has 
particularly difficult epistemic problems. We believe, however, that testing guided by situation 
coverage will be a cost-effective way to find faults in AR, particularly vehicle-level specification 
faults, and that empirical studies will bear this out. We also believe that, over time, AR developers 
will be able to build plausible theories to support their specific SC criteria. 
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5 Useful situation coverage must achieve certain things 
A situation coverage criterion that is to be used as part of a safety argument needs to be based on a 
theory that justifies its adequacy. A theory allows generalisation from the cases we have tested to 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ Wit justifies the uniformity hypothesis for that test set (it justifies treating 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƵďƐĞƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƐƚƐǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĚŽĂƐequivalent to the tests we did do). 
A situation coverage criterion needs to be empirically evaluable, and this evaluation needs to be 
performed. It is not practical to empirically demonstrate the adequacy of a criterion at safety-critical 
levels of integrity, but is certainly possible to empirically show its limitations (for an example, see 
ĂŬĞƌĂŶĚ,Ăďůŝ ?Ɛ[13] use of mutation testing to show weaknesses in DO 178B-compliant test sets; 
Hadley and Clark [14] similarly use mutation testing to challenge MCDC specifically). 
For use in many forms of automated testing, a situation coverage criterion needs to be quantifiable, 
and able to be measured, at least from a simulation where ground truth is available. The challenge 
ŚĞƌĞŝƐŝŶŵŽǀŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĐŚĞĐŬƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚƚŚŝƐƐĞƚŽĨƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŽĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶ ? 
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6 Situation coverage metrics and the use thereof  ? a simple 
example 
Basic Example - One Criterion 
Consider a simulated AR in the form of an autonomous car in a road system. Imagine that simulation 
is reasonably sophisticated e.g. roads may be at arbitrary angles to each other, they may vary in 
width, surface type (and condŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĐĂŵďĞƌ ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƌŽĂĚŵĂƌŬŝŶŐƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ƚŚĞ “ĚŽŶŽƚŽǀĞƌƚĂŬĞ ?
centre line). It supports roads joined by box junctions, roundabouts, mini-roundabouts, and 
unmarked, unsignalised areas that just happen to have several roads attached. At junctions it can 
distinguish between major and minor roads (and provide signs and road markings to indicate that) or 
leave it ambiguous. 
 
tĞĐŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞĂĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŵĞƚƌŝĐĨŽƌ “ĂůůƐŝŵƵůĂƚĂďůĞƌŽĂĚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?ďƵƚĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ
restrictions e.g. the area covered by the system, and the total length of the roads, the space of this is 
enormous - practically infinite for our purposes (certainly if e.g. floating point angles and lengths are 
used). 
There are various ways we can abstract from this model. Here, we will do so by representing the 
road system as a graph, a set of junctions (nodes) and roads between them (edges).  
The graph can be topographic rather than simply topological, and we can require that the edges be 
oriented only at a restricted set of angles  W for simplicity, in this example they can only be angled in 
the four cardinal directions. When representing a simulation map as a graph, roads would be 
assigned to whatever cardinal direction is closest - if this leads to several roads being at the same 
direction, they would be treated as a single road
1 ? ?/ŶƌĞĂůƵƐĞ ?ǁĞ ?ĚǁĂŶƚĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
possibly 16 so as to capture some of the sharper hairpins that occasionally happen e.g. on country 
lanes). 
                                                          
1
 This is probably not as simple as it sounds  W we could lose a fair amount of the complexity of the 
network this way, and possibly change traffic patterns quite a lot as some routes could be deleted by 
this method (and those routes might happen to be heavily used). 
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When making or choosing a test coverage criterion, we want one that is tractable. There are two 
ways to look at this: 
x Given a system under test (SUT) and a set of tests, can a coverage percentage be calculated? 
o Examples that ĚŽŶ ?ƚ satisfy this include: 
 All-paths coverage of a program with loops (there are infinite paths) 
 Percentage of SUT faults triggered (because the full set of faults cannot be 
known with certainty prior to exhaustive testing) 
x Given a SUT and a set of tests, can 100% coverage be achieved under realistic practical use 
conditions? 
o Examples that satisfy the previous condition, but not this one, include: 
 Many dataflow criteria, when applied across procedure (etc.) boundaries in 
non-trivial programs 
In testing, ŝƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŝŶƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƐƚƌƵĞďƵƚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝƐĨĂůƐĞ 
i.e. when a percentage can be calculated but 100% is not realistically attainable. 
Even if we limit the number of nodes and or edges in any given map, that gives us an enormous 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŵĂƉƐ ?Ŷ “ĂůůŵĂƉƐ ?ĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶŝƐƚŚƵƐŝŶƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞ(in the second sense 
ŐŝǀĞŶĂďŽǀĞ ? ?ĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐƌĂƉŚƐŝŵƉůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ŷ “ĂůůƉĂƚŚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵĂƉ ?ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶŝƐĞǀĞŶ
ǁŽƌƐĞ ? ?^ŽĂŶǇĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞǁŝůůĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ǁĂǇĂŐĂŝŶĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ ? 
For this example, we can make a simple criterion that gives us a tractable space (indeed, one we can 
actually draw). The criterion is that the map set includes all possible junction shapes, of which there 
are 15: 
 
Given some test situation we can say which shapes are covered; given a set of test situations we can 
measure the proportion of the shapes that are covered, with the aim to build a set that covers all of 
them. With this in mind, we can represent the criterion as a set of boxes that need to be ticked in 
order for a given map set to meet it: 
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A Further Criterion 
Imagine, now, that the simulation includes pedestrian and other vehicles, of a wide range of types 
and behaviour profiles. For example, for pedestrians it has generic adults, drunk people, children, 
elderly people with several different ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? “ĐƌŽĐŽĚŝůĞƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞŵŽǀŝŶŐŝŶĂ
rough line. It supports a similar range of driver profiles. In terms of vehicles, it has vehicle and driver 
models for cars (commuter, boy/girl racer, drunk, learner, elderly with a driving licence but would 
not pass a driving test now...), HGVs (articulated or single-piece, over-wide vehicles with small 
houses on the back), bicycles (commuter, child, racer ? ?ĂŵďƵůĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚĞĨůŽĂƚƐ ?ŚŽƌƐĞƐ ?ƐŚĞĞƉ ? 
Much as with the road layouts ?ǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƵƐĞ “ĂůůƉĞĞƌƐĞƚƐ ?ĂƐĂĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶ- ǁĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇĐĂŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶĚŽ
 “ĂůůƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĞĞƌƐ ? ?ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞƚŚĂƚĂůůǀĞŚŝĐůĞĂŶĚĚƌŝǀĞƌŵŽĚĞůƐŚĂǀĞŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƚƵŶĞĂďůĞ
parameters, and possibly arbitrary scripting features). So we need to abstract our coverage criteria 
away from that. 
We ĐĂŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^hdŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚ “ƚǇƉĞ ?ŽĨĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚǇƉĞŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐĂŶĂƌƌŽǁ
subset of the possibilities. Here we will say  W car, bicycle, HGV, pedestrian all using a standard 
competent adult driver model  ? “ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚ ? ?ŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞ “ďĞ
placed in a situation such that the SUT must take action to avoid breaking some traffic rule with 
respect ƚŽƚŚĂƚƉĞĞƌĞ ?Ő ?ŵƵƐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĐŽůůŝƐŝŽŶŽƌĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ? ?ĐƚƵĂůly 
implementing the in-simulation detector for that could be difficult.) 
If we wanted a further peer-related criterion, we could take a cross-section of behaviour profiles - 
perhaps expert driver, sub-test-standard (e.g. very elderly) driver, drunk  W and say that the SUT must 
interact with each, also. 
We can represent this as a set of boxes, as before: 
 
A Composite Criterion 
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĐŽŵďŝŶĞƚŚĞŵ ?dŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞƐƚǁĂǇŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ “ƚŚĞ^hdŵƵƐƚ
interact with each entity type and each jƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƉĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞƐƵƐ ? ? ?A? ?A? ? ? ?ďŽǆĞƐ ?ƚŚƵƐ P 
 
This method is concise, as it ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĐĂůĞǀĞƌǇĨĂƐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞůĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇŽƌ
with a larger set of entity types, but ŝƚ ?ƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚƚŚĂƚƵƐĞĨƵů ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĂĐƌŝƚĞ ion 
 “ƚŚĞ^hdŵƵƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚĞŶƚŝƚǇƚǇƉĞat each junction shape ?. (This gives us 15*4=60 boxes): 
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Note: ƚŚŝƐĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚĞƚŚŝŶŐŝƐ “ĂĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶ ? W it is a rule by which a test set (here, a situation set) can 
be judged as complete or not. Like most useful criteria, it also allows a proportion of completeness
2
 
to be assessed - the proportion of boxes hit is the proportional completeness. The two things that 
compose it (which were individually described in the previous sections) are likewise each a criterion.  
In Theory, What Might This Lead To? 
If we are lucky, there might be some bugs lurking in some of the boxes.  
x For example, it might be that our SUT does not, in fact, allow for the length of vehicles, nor 
their turning circle. Perhaps in the case (HGV ) with the HGV approaching from the 
top/north and the SUT from the right/east (note how the criterion as specified currently 
does not say anything about these path-of-entity factors), the SUT may attempt to combine 
its turn with that of the HGV (i.e. turn right exactly as the HGV turns left), not allowing for 
the fact that the HGV will take longer to clear the junction and is likely swing its back wheels 
out further. It may risk a collision (or near miss that requires a sudden evasive manoeuvre 
that is itself risky). 
 
x For example, it might be that our SUT basically assumes all vehicles follow the same speed 
and acceleration patterns. In the case of (Bike ), with the bike going from south to east 
and the SUT from east to north, it may be that the SUT will again try to combine its turn 
optimally such that it crosses the box just as the bike is clearing it. As the bike moves slower 
than the SUT expects, the SUT may commit to a manoeuvre that risks a collision or requires 
risky evasion. 
We ĐĂŶ ?ƚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞĐĂƐĞƐǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞĨŽƵŶĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌŵĞĂŶƐ ?EŽƌƚŚĂƚthe junction 
interaction criterion would definitely find them - they require other conditions identified above (i.e. 
directions of entry and exit) that are not part of the criterion, and even then they may only manifest 
if the timings, junction sizes and approach speeds, etc., have suitable values. You could tick all sixty 
boxes without running suitable cases. But the point is that the criterion requires that we run test 
cases which have some of the properties required to reveal these bugs. 
In Practice, is this Criterion Actually Likely to be Any Use? 
This is a more difficult question than the previous one, and tŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽůĞǀĞůƐŽĨ “ǇĞƐ ? P 
1. It leads us to find some bugs that might have been found by other means, for about the 
same cost 
2. /ƚůĞĂĚƐƵƐƚŽĨŝŶĚƐŽŵĞďƵŐƐƚŚĂƚƉƌŽďĂďůǇǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƵŶĚ 
Failing to meet even the first level means it ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇǁŽƌƐĞƚŚĂŶŝƚƐƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ŽŶĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ “ŶŽ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚĞƐƚĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶĂƚĂůů ? ?
Of course, a coverage criterion by itself cannot reveal bugs - it can only do so when paired with a test 
generation strategy which in some way is guided by that criterion. Furthermore, naive application of 
any tractable criterion can easily devolve into ineffective testing that meets the criterion in the 
absolute minimum way - ƚŚĞǇĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂďƵƚĚŽŶ ?ƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵƵĐŚǁŽƌƚŚǁŚŝůĞ
testing (i.e. practical coverage criteria are only ever a check on the adequacy of our testing  W we can 
never, in practice, spell out everything that our tests need to do  W see Gay et al. [5] and Hadley and 
Clark [14]). 
                                                          
2
 As usual for coverage criteria, the confidence of adequate testing we should take from percentages 
less than 100 is quite unclear. 
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The precise nature of the test generation strategy, therefore, is also of critical importance. Situation 
coverage is but one component of good AR testing. 
Ahead-of-Run versus In-Run Coverage 
In the above, wĞ ?ǀĞglossed over one issue - do we assess the coverage achieved by a set of 
situations before we run them (Ahead-of-ZƵŶ ?ŽƌĂĨƚĞƌǁĞ ?ǀĞƌƵŶƚŚĞŵ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐĐount of things we 
measure during the runs (In-Run). 
In the example here, Ahead-of-Run (AoR) is quite limited, in that about the best we can do is change 
ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶƚŽ “ĂůůũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƉĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƉǁŝƚŚĂůůĞŶƚŝƚǇƚǇƉĞƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?
having a  on the map and an HGV on the map ticks the (HGV ) box. In contrast, In-Run (IR) 
allows us to score whether the SUT really entered a junction of a particular type, and whether it 
interacted with an entity of a particular type in that junction. Until that happens, no box is ticked. 
Generally, therefore, an IR approach is more powerful. 
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7  Some likely questions and some reasonable answers 
Why would requirements-based testing not give adequate coverage?  
Situation generation based on situation coverage is a complement to requirements-based testing. 
Kaner et al. [9] say (item 48 in their book)  W   
"If someone tells you to do 'requirements-based testing' she might be talking about any combination 
of these three ideas 
x Coverage (Test everything listed in this requirements document) 
x Potential problems (Test for any way that each requirement might not be met) 
x Evaluation (Design your tests in a way that allows you to use the requirements specification 
ƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƉĂƐƐĞĚŽƌĨĂŝůĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƐƚ ? ? ? 
dĂŬŝŶŐŽƵƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶĂƐ “ĂůůŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ ?ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?, we also need to consider what level of 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐǁĞĐŽǀĞƌ ?/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŝůůŚĂǀĞƐŽŵĞǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚ-ůĞǀĞůƐĂĨĞƚǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? “Ž
ŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂŶǇŚƵŵĂŶǁŚŝůĞŵŽǀŝŶŐĂƚĂƐƉĞĞĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞůŽǁĞƌ-level derived 
requirements ƚŚĂƚĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐĞƚŚĞŵŝŶƚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂďůĞ ? “tŝƚŚŝŶ ? ? ?ƐŽĨĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŶŐĂƐŽůŝĚ
not-permissible-to-damage object on a 2-seconds-to-collision-ƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇĂ ‘ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵďƌĂŬŝŶŐ ?
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŵƵƐƚďĞƐĞŶƚƚŽĞĂĐŚǁŚĞĞůŵŽƚŽƌ ? ?. 
We can safely say: 
x Coverage  W situation coverage covers external situations based on our knowledge of those. 
We do not propose basing our choice of situations on any requirements specification. So our 
coverage goal is different. 
x Potential problems  W we are looking for ways that requirements might not be met, but with 
respect to high-level safety requirements ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞZ ?Ɛ
behaviour. So we are looking for slightly different problems. 
x Evaluation  W again, we use the high-level safety requirements to provide our pass/fail 
criteria. So we have slightly different evaluation criteria. 
For the lower-level derived requirements, SC-based testing is a means of evaluation/validation for 
those requirements - it has a good chance of shoǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞǁƌŽŶŐ ?dŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
something that requirements-based testing is not well placed to do. We suspect this will be the main 
benefit of SGen-SC over requirements-based testing. 
Why would testing of scenarios identified by the safety analysis process not give 
adequate coverage?  
Testing based on safety analysis is indeed a strong rival  W it can lead engineers to recognise that they 
have missed a requirement that will be needed for safety. 
Our approach may, of course, beat weak safety analysis approaches. And from our limited 
experience it is clear that some industrial practice is weak (also, sometimes, the explicit methods 
engineers ƵƐĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŚĞůƉƚŚĞŵǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ Wthe fact that they do well is down to their 
individual expertise). 
Most explicit safety analysis  W at least the kind that is likely to reveal challenging unforeseen aspects 
of the environment  W is a paper-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ŵĂŶƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?/ƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĐĂůĞparticularly well to complex 
combinations of events and situations. An automated, simulation-based process, guided by situation 
coverage, may do better. 
/ƚ ?ƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽanswer the above question directly and convincingly, ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇĐŽƐƚůǇ
and difficult to do any empirical or data-gathering work on real projects (e.g. we are unlikely to be 
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able to get access to AR-developer data regarding which kinds of faults slipped through what kinds 
of testing). 
For In-Run / Micro-SC (where the SC refers to events that happen during a run, e.g. 
 “ƚŚĞ^hdĨŽůůŽǁƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƚƵƌŶƐ ? ? ?ǁŚǇŶŽƚũƵƐƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ
those situations up front i.e. fill in the  “ďŽǆĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞSC one-by-one by generating 
situations to order? 
This would be a good idea, if you can do it. But doing so may be difficult - you may not be able to 
code an algorithm in reasonable effort that generates those situations deterministically and 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ ?ƐŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞǁŚĂƚ you want (here, cover some specific SC 
criteria) than to write a good algorithm to generate it. This is likely to be particularly true if your SC 
asks for more complex interactions or event sequences. 
The standard computer science fallback in such a case is to use a metaheuristic, such as evolutionary 
search, to throw paint at the wall until our goals are met.  
If we can write a deterministic algorithm that will generate the situations in each box, then we 
should probably do that. However, as mentioned previously, we know that even for well-established 
software structural metrics, really aggressive test generation based on metrics alone gives dubious 
tests  W the tests generated might cover the precise criteria specified, without actually providing 
sensible testing.   
So, we want to test more than those precise situations that the metric calls for - we want to at least 
cover those while covering some other SUT-in-world behaviour as well. At the very least, we want 
some random variation in there (e.g. we miŐŚƚǁĂŶƚĞĂĐŚ “ďŽǆ ?ŝŶƚŚĞSC to be  ‘hit ‘ten times by 
runs that are different to each other (e.g. different random generation)). 
SC can also be used as an additional check on situation sets generated by other means (much as you 
can use path/branch/MCDC/mutation to check the adequacy of a hand-crafted test set).  This is 
perhaps where it will be most valuable. 
If we use an evolutionary search technique that targets SC, is this really likely to be 
better than (or at least complementary to) a search-for-difficult-situations model 
where you define some difficulty/complexity metrics (e.g.  ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƚĂƌƚĂŶĚĚĞƐƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?) and target those instead? 
It may be. 
One reason it might - ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ƐŽǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚof identifying a 
good enough set of difficulty metrics. After all, if we could do this perfectly then it would imply we 
know nearly where all the bugs are. That would be an unusual state of affairs, to say the least. 
Diversity of testing is important because of this lack of understanding.  
Of course, infinite diversity requires infinite effort. We need to justify our SC somehow, too. 
NB doing a difficulty metric ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ necessarily require specific knowledge of the SUT - you can in 
theory do this on a more abstract model of a cognitive agent or similar. But to do it really well would 
probably require SUT-specific knowledge (see the following comment and response). 
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^ŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŽƵƌĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶŶŽƚũƵƐƚǁŚĂƚƐŝƚuations are possible 
to encounter but what situations are likely to cause problems for our specific SUT, 
given its precise nature e.g. what we know about how it's coded, the maturity of 
certain components and the technologies they depend on, etc.? 
In practice, yes. This is a factor we could consider when choosing SC metrics in real development, SC 
is ŽŶĞƚǇƉĞŽĨĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶĨŽƌĂ “ŐŽŽĚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƚ ?- others include expected difficulty, requirements 
coverage, system component coverage etc. 
For our immediate research, we are studying SC on its own. Eventually, we or others should 
investigate whether adding SC to an already fairly mature test process (which already has 
requirements coverage, code coverage etc.) is likely to increase testing power. 
It is possible that SC ŵĂǇǁŽƌŬǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ^hdƚŚĂƚĚĞĞƉůǇ ?KŶĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĐŽƵůĚĨŝŶĚďƵŐƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƚĂůů ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐďƵŐƐ
ƚŚĂƚĚŽŶ ?ƚǀŝŽůĂƚĞǇŽƵr derived requirements/vehicle behaviour specification but blatantly violate 
your high-level safety requirements.  
Why is metaheuristic-search-for-SC (etc) likely to give superior SC to random 
approaches?  
With any random generation approach, there will be biases towards some situations and away from 
others. Whatever algorithm you use, certain situations will only be reached by unlikely combinations 
of random results - more so for more complex algorithms (and no algorithm that generates plausible 
situations is likely to be simple). Good SC is likely to require algorithms that explicitly search for it. 
ƵƚĂƌĞŶ ?ƚƚŚŽƐĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚdo get missed by a random generator likely to be 
the highly improbable ones anyway (especially if you shape your random 
generation using operationally expected probabilities)? 
Yes. However: 
x Even if we set out to guide generation by operationally expected probabilities, in a plausible 
ǁĂǇ ?ǁĞ ?ůůďĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚƐůŝŐŚƚůǇǁƌŽŶŐ W some of our very rare situations will be more common 
than our generator suggests. /ĨŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ?ǁĞ ?ůůŶĞĞĚĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƐƚŝĐ “ďƵĨĨĞƌ ?
ďĞĨŽƌĞǁĞĚĞĐůĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ “ƚŽŽŝŵƉƌŽďĂďůĞƚŽǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚŐŝǀĞŶŽƵƌƐĂĨĞƚǇƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?Ğ ?Ő ?
a 10
-6
 target might require a 10
-8
 ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞďĞĨŽƌĞǁĞ ?ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚ ?.
 
x ƐǁŝƚŚŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽ run as many adequately-
detailed simulations as we would like. We may therefore not have statistically adequate data 
for the claims we want to make. The problem above compounds this. 
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8 Conclusions  ? situation coverage cannot be avoided 
Testing that inadequately covers the situations that the AR will encounter is inadequate testing. 
Explicit measurement of situation coverage therefore has potential to improve our AR testing, and it 
is practical to implement. There are a great many decisions to be made about how best to do it, and 
it raises all the normal epistemic challenges of serious use of test coverage criteria. 
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Glossary 
x AoR ± Ahead-of-Run  
 
x AR - Autonomous Robot 
 
x IR ± In-Run 
 
x SC ± Situation Coverage 
 
x SGen ± Situation Generation 
 
x SUT ± System Under Test ± the AR WKDWZH¶UHWHVWLQJDVGLVWLQFWIURPDQ\RWKHU
ARs we have put in the situation as part of the test) 
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